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Governing Under Pressure: German Policy
Making During the Coronavirus Crisis
J €ORG MICHAEL DOSTAL
Abstract
The global threat of the coronavirus pandemic has forced policy makers to react quickly with
totally new policy-making approaches under conditions of uncertainty. This article focuses
on such crisis-driven policy learning, examining how the experiences of China and South
Korea as early responder states influenced the subsequent coronavirus crisis management in
Germany. The first reaction of the German core executive was the quick concentration of
decision-making power at the top of the political hierarchy. Asserting the prerogatives of the
executive included the radical simplification of the relationship between politics, law and
science. State actors took emergency measures by recourse to a single piece of legislation—
the ‘infection protection law’ (Infektionsschutzgesetz)—overriding other elements of the legal
order. They also limited the government’s use of scientific expertise to a small number of
advisors, thereby cutting short debates about the appropriateness or otherwise of the govern-
ment’s crisis measures. Finally, German actors failed to understand that some of the earlier
Chinese and Korean responses required a precondition—namely public willingness to sacri-
fice privacy for public health—that is absent in the German case.
Keywords: China, coronavirus, Germany, policy learning, risk, South Korea
Introduction
THE NEW CORONAVIRUS (medical term: SARS-
CoV-2/COVID-19) has challenged global
policy making. Some features of the new
politics of the virus might be comparable
with earlier events: in terms of the medical
puzzle, the HIV/Aids crisis of the early
1980s and, more recently, the SARS and
MERS virus outbreaks occurring since 2002
and 2012 in a number of countries come to
mind. Nevertheless, the current coronavirus
pandemic is much more challenging: it
includes medical, political and economic
emergencies and connects each individual
citizen with global risk society. Thus, the
collapse of globalisation as we knew it in
the spring of 2020 has revealed pre-existing
shortcomings of our economic, political and
moral norms in an era of permanent eco-
logical crisis.
This article focuses on German public
policy responses to the coronavirus crisis. It
first presents some German political sociol-
ogy approaches that are relevant in the
context of analysing coronavirus crisis man-
agement. The second section sketches how
the coronavirus challenge triggered sponta-
neous policy learning across the globe,
although the lessons learned in the early per-
iod (January to March) differed markedly
from those acquired at later stages when
reflection on the usefulness or otherwise of
early policies set in. Section three zooms in
on China and South Korea as early respon-
ders to the coronavirus pandemic, examining
how the two countries became role models
and influenced subsequent German policy
making. The fourth section describes German
coronavirus policy making under conditions
of intense uncertainty about the nature of
the problem, dramatic time pressures and
competing demands for health and economic
protection. Section five returns to the analyti-
cal focus on political sociology, examining
how German political executives attempted
to learn relevant policy lessons from else-
where. It also looks at how their efforts to
contain coronavirus-related risks produced
new kinds of risk elsewhere. The conclusion
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sums up lessons of German policy (mis-)
learning during the coronavirus period.
The political sociology of
coronavirus crisis management
German political sociologists offer some use-
ful analytical concepts to understand coron-
avirus-related challenges. These concern the
question of how states act under emergency
conditions. The obvious starting point is
Ulrich Beck’s concept of a ‘world risk soci-
ety’ underlining that more and more policy-
making problems of our age encountered by
individual states are global in scope and can
only be addressed adequately by coordi-
nated global efforts.1 Perceiving risk on a
global scale produces two contradictory
responses in national policy making. On the
one hand, the public’s fear of risk grows fur-
ther because delocalisation, incalculability,
and absence of clear compensatory mecha-
nisms all serve to highlight the weakness of
risk-containing policies at the national level.
On the other hand, the perception of global
risk can also serve to empower individual
states: a national government that promises
to deal with ‘threats to humanity’ and claims
to reduce citizens’ exposure to risk based on
precautionary principles might gain power
resources that would not otherwise be avail-
able to it.2 In fact, the coronavirus pandemic
highlights how global risk perception can
strengthen the discretionary power of
national executives.
Dealing with similar questions, Niklas
Luhmann’s sociological ‘systems theory’
might explain how state executives are able
to overcome barriers to political decision
making. According to Luhmann, modern
societies are characterised by their increasing
functional differentiation into subfields. Cru-
cially, the internal means of communication
within each subfield become more important
in comparison with any overarching logic of
societal integration. Throughout his career,
Luhmann wrote a series of monographs on
what he considered major subfields of mod-
ern society, focussing in particular on politi-
cal, economic and legal systems. Observing
the different criteria for ‘success’ within each
system (power, money, reputation, and so
on), he stressed the fact that effective
communication between participants in dif-
ferent subfields became more and more diffi-
cult.3 Although Luhmann never wrote at
length on ‘the medicine of society’, his high-
lighting of basic communication problems
between different fields and systems—how
can medical knowledge become a tool to cre-
ate legitimacy for political decisions?—ap-
pears highly significant during the
coronavirus crisis.4
A related problem is how politics and law
interact and whether or not legal limits on
state authority are maintained under condi-
tions of severe crisis. Here, it is appropriate
to recall Germany’s earlier experiences with
the collapse of the legal order during the
Nazi period. In particular, Ernst Fraenkel’s
focus on distinguishing between the ‘norma-
tive state’ (Normenstaat), bound by written
laws, and the ‘prerogative state’ (Maßnah-
menstaat) remains analytically useful. Accord-
ing to Fraenkel, the latter manifestation of
the state ignores written law as soon as an
issue becomes defined as ‘political’. This
allows for direct state measures overriding
the codified legal order and satisfying ad hoc
demands by political controllers of the state.5
The point is not, of course, to compare con-
temporary Germany with the Nazi state.
Rather, one must stress that modern versions
of the ‘prerogative state’ might come about
by accident—based on the ‘good intentions’
of an executive that feels pressured by an
emergency situation to protect the public
against an immediate danger.
Crucially, conflicts between politics and
law as social systems might escalate in both
directions, depending on which side is
expanding at the expense of the other. For
example, ongoing growth in the complexity
and density of the legal order at various
levels, including below and beyond the
nation state, might decrease the ability of
political actors to take decisions in an effec-
tive and timely manner. Such tensions could
result in gridlock of both systems. A retired
former chair of the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court, Hans-J€urgen Papier, argued
pre-coronavirus crisis that Germany’s politi-
cal system was in danger of giving up on
enforcing existing laws. In procedural terms,
this was, according to Papier, because of the
chronic overload of the legal system result-
ing in unacceptable delays in legal
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judgements. In substantive terms, he sug-
gested that Germany’s ‘diesel scandal’ (limits
on car emissions had been legally mandated
but had not been enforced), and the state’s
failure to deport legally rejected asylum
seekers pointed to enforcement gaps, ques-
tioning the stability of the legal order. Dur-
ing the coronavirus pandemic, the same
commentator has stressed that German
politicians’ single-minded focus on applying
the ‘infection protection law’ (Infektionss-
chutzgesetz)—used to override other legal
provisions—questions the basic individual
freedoms outlined in the German constitu-
tion and the liberal order in general.6 In
summary, pre-existing conflicts between
political and legal decision making escalate
further during the coronavirus crisis.
The coronavirus crisis and global
policy learning
The coronavirus pandemic has triggered glo-
bal policy debates under conditions of
extreme uncertainty. Underestimating or
overestimating the initial threat was a very
real danger. Some followed the former
approach (‘it is just like the flu’) while others
followed the latter approach (‘a totally
unprecedented threat to humanity’). Policy
learning therefore occurred on a trial-and-er-
ror basis, moving between these two
extremes. While still trying to learn, actors
could be mistaken more than once—such as
in the case of European governments first
underestimating the challenge, and then act-
ing under the influence of fear bordering on
panic, and turning to extreme measures
without considering alternative options. Cru-
cially, one must acknowledge that threat per-
ceptions differed vastly along the timeline
since the beginning of the pandemic and in
different countries. The coronavirus crisis of
February and March appeared to many as
an existential threat, while the situation in
April and May made some wonder whether
the dangers had been vastly overstated. Dur-
ing the first period, the TV pictures from
coronavirus hotspots such as Wuhan in
China, Bergamo in Italy and New York City
captured the public imagination. In the sec-
ond period, increasing public awareness of
empty hospitals in many OECD countries
and rising doubt about any direct correlation
between coronavirus infections and fatalities
shifted the public’s perception. In the early
period, policy learning was mostly sponta-
neous—copying coronavirus policies that
seemed to work elsewhere.
To put it differently, what emerged was
an unpremeditated world risk community.
This community lacked any clear coordinat-
ing mechanisms and at times appeared to
drift toward inter-state conflicts, such as dur-
ing the global scramble for masks and per-
sonal protective equipment when some
countries started to accuse others of foul
play. Nevertheless, it was in certain respects
a community: the coronavirus-related mea-
sures taken by OECD and non-OECD states
appeared surprisingly similar and bypassed
previous divergence in national policy-mak-
ing styles. With the advantage of hindsight,
it is only to be expected that many of the
early crisis-managing policies will be found
to have been irrelevant or even harmful.
Thus, future debate will certainly focus on
how the coronavirus crisis differed from text-
book expectations of pandemics. Namely,
many medical specialists initially assumed
that the infectious spread of the virus was
nearly impossible to stop until a majority of
the public had become infected (the so-called
‘herd immunity’ approach suggesting that
people passing through an infection would
gain immunity). It was further assumed that
once such mass infection had run its course
and around two thirds of the population had
passed through an infectious episode, any
further spread of the virus would end owing
to a lack of remaining viable hosts. How-
ever, the actual experience of the coronavirus
pandemic suggests at the moment of writing
(late May 2020) that the virus is less easily
transmitted than was initially assumed.
Recent, more representative studies of infec-
tion rates further suggest that the share of
people so far affected by the virus remains—
even in former coronavirus hotspots—below
15 per cent of the population, and usually
much lower. Moreover, many people who—
according to test results—have been infected
with coronavirus report that they never
noticed any symptoms. In summary, future
policy debates will largely concern economic,
legal and social consequences of the coron-
avirus crisis management rather than the
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initial medical puzzles. However, the next
section looks back at the early period
between January and March examining how
the two most prominent early coronavirus
responder states, China and South Korea,
influenced subsequent German policy
making.
Early responder states: China and
South Korea
Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, German
and other western policy makers were fairly
ignorant about the dangers of pandemics,
while their Arab, African, and Asian coun-
terparts all had to deal with them as recently
as during the 2002 SARS and 2012 and 2015
MERS outbreaks. Such earlier experiences
are a major explanatory factor for the rela-
tive success or failure of individual countries
during the current coronavirus crisis. China
and South Korea differ in terms of their
respective political systems, yet they share
strong bureaucratic capabilities in terms of
implementing public policies and provide
near-universal access to healthcare for their
citizens. Both countries enjoy strategic auton-
omy in information and communication
technologies (ICT). Citizens are socialised to
access public services via their smartphones
and a large share of public and private sec-
tor business takes place online. In addition,
China is a major and sometimes leading
manufacturer of medical and health-related
products, including personal protective
equipment. Although China’s per capita
spending on healthcare is fairly low and the
coverage and quality of medical services dif-
fer between urban and rural areas, the coun-
try nevertheless enjoys strong capabilities in
terms of reacting to medical emergencies. In
particular, Communist Party and neighbour-
hood committees are able to enforce policy
at the local level and the military can pro-
vide logistical and medical emergency sup-
port at short notice.
In South Korea, near-universal access to
high quality healthcare and affordable medi-
cal insurance has brought down differences
in life expectancy relating to social class in
comparison with other OECD countries.
Moreover, South Korea’s progressive liberal
President Moon Jae-in was voted into office
in 2017 in reaction to the poor track record
of the previous conservative administration
in the field of public safety (most notably the
sinking of the Sewol ferry in 2014 which
killed 304 South Korean citizens, including
250 students). Thus, the authority of Presi-
dent Moon clearly depends on the ability of
his administration to demonstrate that les-
sons have been learned from previous fail-
ure. Another significant explanatory factor
shared by China and South Korea is that
both countries have comprehensively ratio-
nalised their health services: Chinese and
South Korean medical doctors see many
more patients per day compared with their
western counterparts, and their work is sup-
ported by a larger number of nursing staff
and ICT-based medical diagnostic proce-
dures which were useful in reacting to the
coronavirus pandemic.
The remainder of this section briefly
sketches Chinese and South Korean major
responses to the coronavirus epidemic. (Simi-
lar policies have also been applied in smaller
East Asian jurisdictions such as Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Singapore.) Initially, local
Chinese authorities in the city of Wuhan
reacted with delay to the appearance of a
new type of infectious disease. They did not
use official chains of communication with
the central government, but instead tried to
to solve the problem at the local level. Fol-
lowing this delay, a cluster of pneumonia
cases of unknown origin was reported to the
Chinese National Health Commission on 30
December 2019. Subsequently, a Shanghai-
based lab analysed the new virus and the
genome sequence was shared on 12 January
with the World Health Organization. Subse-
quently, this allowed numerous countries to
develop PCR-based tests to screen for the
new virus. On 23 January, Wuhan, with a
population of around 11 million, was quar-
antined when there were officially only
around 300 detected infections and seven-
teen deaths. In quick succession, the Chinese
government closed the surrounding Hubei
province (50 million people) and subse-
quently enforced a general lockdown of pub-
lic life, affecting around half of the country’s
population. This operation amounted to the
largest quarantine effort in human history.
These policies were officially ended with the
reopening of Wuhan city on 8 April.
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Crucially, most western observers thought
that the Chinese policies would never be
applicable to western liberal democracies.
The medical emergency was seen as a Chi-
nese or Asian problem rather than a global
one. However, not all German reactions to
the Chinese efforts were critical of them. In
an interesting statement, Professor Christian
Drosten, head of the Institute of Virology at
Charite Hospital Berlin, who was at this time
just emerging as Germany’s coronavirus ‘ex-
plainer-in-chief’ and has since become a
household name, used a meeting of the Ber-
lin Medical Society to praise China for ‘pro-
viding the world certainly some more weeks
of time based on a heroic epidemiological
act’.7
In comparison with China, South Korea’s
response is more attractive to western policy
makers because the coronavirus was con-
tained by less authoritarian means. For a
short period between late February and mid-
March 2020, the country appeared to be in
danger of becoming the second virus hotspot
after China. However, most of South Korea’s
infections occurred in two regional places
and many were related to members of a reli-
gious group whose services had served as
incubators. The two outbreaks were discov-
ered at the same time, after which all group
members were tested for the virus. This par-
ticular event made South Korea’s crisis
appear more critical than was really the case.
As previously in China, the South Korean
government applied ICT-based surveillance
of citizens’ smart phones to monitor the
spread of the coronavirus, but unlike China,
a general lockdown of public life was
avoided: ‘Korea is the only country with a
population of over 50 million that has slo-
wed the spread of the virus, and flattened
the curve of new infections without shutting
down the country nor the city at the epicen-
ter of the outbreak, without imposing
extreme personal travel or movement restric-
tions, and without closing airports or taking
other authoritarian actions’.8
In terms of policy, South Korea has high-
lighted the use of combined ‘track, trace and
treat’ based on easy access to testing facili-
ties, quick transmission of results and rapid
hospitalisation of those needing medical
treatment. If tested positive, virus-affected
people are placed in four different treatment
categories, depending on the severity of
symptoms, and placed in ‘living and treat-
ment support centers’ or various specialised
hospitals. Those in close social contact with
infected people are in turn subjected to test-
ing and/or are asked to engage in two
weeks of self-quarantine. Once quarantined,
people must use their smart phones to trans-
mit twice-daily self-examinations, answering
four questions about whether or not they
have developed symptoms. If people report
any symptoms, they are immediately con-
nected to telemedicine facilities and spe-
cialised hospitals. Moreover, citizens’
compliance with their home quarantine is
also monitored through smartphone track-
ing, and civil servants are required to check
on people’s whereabouts if there are any
gaps in reporting.
The Korean government stresses that ‘ICT
helps social distancing’. However, this
depends on ‘multi-agency coordination
under a central platform’, which is in turn
facilitated by previous legislation such as the
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention
Act. The scope of this legislation was
expanded in response to the 2015 MERS out-
break in South Korea and allows access to
patient statements and ‘personal information
through location tracking, [credit] card trans-
actions, and CCTV recordings for accurate
tracing’.9 It further allows the police to
request information, without a warrant, on
people who are ‘likely’ to pose a potential
infectious risk from a large variety of institu-
tions such as ‘medical institutions, pharma-
cies, corporations, organizations, and
individuals’.10
Although western, and particularly Ger-
man policy makers, have become keen on
copying the South Korean use of ICT and
smart phones to monitor coronavirus trans-
missions, they arguably put the cart before
the horse. In particular, South Korean citi-
zens have long accepted ubiquitous smart-
phone use to access public services in
general, and the health system in particular.
Moreover, they generally accept that their
data privacy is suspended for the duration
of a pandemic. Such preconditions are absent
in the German case, where the general public
is unlikely to cooperate with smartphone-
based monitoring of mobility and personal
contact patterns to the extent that would be
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required to make an app useful, and any
efforts of public authorities to enforce com-
pliance with a new monitoring system
would be likely to trigger a substantial back-
lash. Data protection and civil liberties aside,
the German ICT infrastructure is not devel-
oped enough to allow for the speedy intro-
duction of a coronavirus app.
German responses to the
coronavirus pandemic
Throughout February 2020, German politi-
cians and the general public were largely
ignorant about the potential severity of the
coronavirus threat. At this time, the German
health minister Jens Spahn assured the pub-
lic that the situation was under control and
that Germany was well equipped to deal
with any crisis. That not all was well first
became apparent with the occasional men-
tioning in the media of an acute shortage of
protective masks. In early 2020, Germany
had responded positively to the Chinese
government’s request to purchase the exist-
ing stock of masks and other personal pro-
tective equipment. Any existing German
stock of such materials had usually been
imported from China and was now re-ex-
ported on the understanding that China
required the protective kit more urgently.
Shortly after, Germany introduced an export
block on masks and protective gear in
response to Italian and Swiss requests to
purchase such materials from Germany. It
now became apparent that Germany in fact
was running short of supplies. This general
shortage of access to basic protective materi-
als subsequently became a permanent fea-
ture of Germany’s coronavirus crisis.
In early March, the sudden announcement
of the closure of public life in Italy, accompa-
nied by the chaotic flight of Italians from
their northern Italian jobs to their southern
Italian homes, brought home the message
that Europe would not escape the pandemic.
The decisive step to raise Germany’s public
awareness of the crisis was Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s press conference on 11
March 2020 in which she declared that ‘ex-
perts’ believed that 60 to 70 per cent of Ger-
mans would at some point or other be
infected with Covid-19. Since the pandemic
could not be stopped, the strategic response
was to ‘slow down the spread of the virus
and of infections’.11 Subsequently, this policy
approach was referred to as ‘flattening the
curve’ (the English-language term was used
in the German debate). After a transition
period of some days, a ‘lockdown’ of public
life was introduced in Bavaria on 20 March
and in the rest of Germany on 22 March
(here too, English was used since the Ger-
man equivalent Ausgangssperre implies a con-
notation reminding people of war settings).
Other significant factors in public acceptance
of the lockdown were media reporting about
the partial collapse of healthcare facilities in
northern Italy owing to the coronavirus cri-
sis, and the parallel emergence of a number
of German local virus hotspots such as the
city of Heinsberg in North Rhine-Westphalia
and a number of locations in Bavaria. Some
of these hotspots were, in turn, linked to
German holidaymakers who had become
infected in neighbouring Austria.
In practical terms, German policy making
included the following measures: (1) closure
of all non-essential businesses with the
exception of food stores, pharmacies and,
somehow counterintuitively, flower shops;
(2) closure of all schools and universities and
most childcare provision; (3) outlawing of
public gatherings; (4) warnings against tra-
vel, but without any explicit prohibitions; (5)
recommendation to engage in ‘social distanc-
ing’ from others; (6) the cancellation of
planned medical procedures in hospitals,
refocussing capacity on the coronavirus pan-
demic; (7) closure of homes for the elderly
and care facilities to the public, including the
prohibition of visits by family members. Citi-
zens were advised to stay at home and to
leave only for essential activities such as
food shopping or visits to medical facilities
and pharmacies. Overall, the measures were
enforced in a ‘soft’ manner compared with
countries such as Spain, Italy, and France,
that is, mainly via ‘nudging’ rather than
direct enforcement. A strategy paper com-
missioned by the Federal Ministry of the
Interior suggested encouraging a ‘feeling of
shock’ based on ‘primal fear’ to achieve vol-
untary compliance with the measures.12
Moreover, those deemed essential workers
were not covered by the recommendation to
stay at home. This concerned workers in the
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health services and other parts of the public
sector. In practice, it left a grey zone in
which many economic activities continued,
although the rapid collapse of supply chains
and the parallel disappearance of access to
export markets effectively closed down most
German industries.
Another major reason for the general
acceptance of the lockdown was that the
government quickly promised economic bail-
outs for all sectors of society. The first step
was the German parliament’s unanimous
decision, on 13 March 2020, to allow workers
displaced from their employment easier
access to the ‘short-time work allowance’
(Kurzarbeitergeld). This policy enables compa-
nies to keep workers on the payroll but
shifts the wage bill to the national labour
office. Significantly, agency and temporary
workers were included alongside regular
workers. At first sight, this appeared to pro-
tect some of the vulnerable groups in the
labour market. However, the actual imple-
mentation of protective programmes differed
from region to region. Many self-employed
people discovered that they either did not
qualify for assistance or that the funding had
already been exhausted. Thus, the underly-
ing problem of the collapse in demand
within many economic sectors remains a
major threat to small and medium sized
enterprises and the self-employed.
Analysing the German case:
perspectives of political sociology
on policy learning
Considered from the analytical perspective
of political sociology, the policies of the
German government can be seen within the
global and regional context of a ‘risk com-
munity’ as not differing fundamentally
from those of most other EU countries. In
particular, decisions of neighbouring coun-
tries such as Austria with regard to border
closures, social distancing and efforts to
‘flatten the curve’ meant that Germany
would be forced to follow the general drift
of events. Moreover, keeping Germany’s
economy open—by selecting a more
nuanced and targeted approach along
South Korean lines, or a more voluntary
one along Swedish lines—was not a
realistic option because of the country’s
dependency on global and EU-based supply
chains that were already collapsing follow-
ing lockdown policies elsewhere.
In terms of Luhmann’s ‘systems theory’,
the crisis management of German policy
makers can be explained rather elegantly.
Crucially, the relationship between the major
systems of politics, law and science (for
which, under coronavirus conditions, read as
‘medicine’ and ‘infectious epidemiology’)
had to be simplified radically, asserting the
dominance of the political executive, in order
to allow for rapid decision making. In terms
of the relationship between politics and law,
all political measures were declared to be
covered by the ‘infection protection law’
(Infektionsschutzgesetz). This particular law
was amended and significantly expanded by
the federal parliament on 25 March 2020 and
came into force on 27 March. The expanded
law now overruled various other legislative
provisions, including numerous constitu-
tional basic rights. This process ignored the
fact that the law had never been expected to
cover decisions of such magnitude and, fur-
thermore, failed to answer questions on how
the closure of the economy would be dealt
with from a legal point of view.
Regarding the relationship between poli-
tics and science, Germany’s core executive,
led by the Chancellor, suggested that ‘ex-
perts’ would advise political decision mak-
ing. However, this process had to be
simplified radically in order to avoid a
cacophony of contradictory expert advice. To
solve this problem, the number of ‘experts’
drafted in by the government and presented
to the public was initially limited to two aca-
demics, namely the above-mentioned Dros-
ten and Lothar Wieler, the head of the
government-funded Robert Koch-Institute.
These two professors—the latter selected
owing to his position as head of the Institute
rather than because of his academic special-
ism in veterinary medicine—gained the
lion’s share of media attention during the
early weeks of Germany’s lockdown. The
purpose of this arrangement can be seen as
being in the interest of policy makers in that
it simplifies their own leadership roles.
After streamlining the relationship
between politics, law and science, the core
executive began to downscale the procedures
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of political life. The Chancellor and Vice
Chancellor (the latter also finance minister)
now assumed centre stage. Other Christian
Democratic (CDU/CSU) politicians, namely
the current contenders for Merkel’s succes-
sion and the nominal party leaders of the
SPD, largely disappeared from sight. What
remained in terms of core actors during the
coronavirus crisis were government minis-
ters representing the most important portfo-
lios of health, labour, economics and social
and family affairs, while the interior minister
was for unexplained reasons absent. In terms
of German federalism, the relationship
between the Berlin-based federal government
and the sixteen regions became limited to
direct negotiations between the Chancellor
and the regional prime ministers. All virus-
related policies were now negotiated in this
ad hoc way, largely bypassing the parliamen-
tary system. Although the federal parliament
still conducted sessions, only a handful of
representatives attended in person, while the
remainder of MPs followed events from their
home offices. In this context, the rising domi-
nance of the core executive was accompa-
nied by the rapid decline in the public
profile of all four opposition parties (in order
of size the AfD, liberal FDP, Left Party and
Greens).
Because of the sudden drop from sight of
most traditional political actors, policy delib-
eration now shifted to media venues. This
allowed Germany’s legacy media (state TV
and print newspapers) to regain some of its
former clout compared with the digital alter-
native media. In particular, TV talk shows
became important venues for discussing gov-
ernment policy. One of Germany’s longstand-
ing talk show hosts stressed in this context
that ‘this entire [coronavirus] thing is about
communication . . . what one says, how one
says it, with what kind of unity one shows
up’.13 His subsequent criticism of the political
actors—who at this point strongly disagreed
about how to introduce a smartphone-based
tracing app in Germany—was typical in its
attempt to blame policy ambiguity on the
absence of effective leadership.
Reacting at least indirectly to this kind of
criticism, some politicians in turn started to
blame other actors, namely the virologists,
for failing to provide clear guidance. Two
typical voices in this respect were the prime
minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, Chris-
tian Democrat Armin Laschet, and the leader
of the liberal FDP opposition party, Christian
Lindner. Both used talk show appearances to
suggest that the virologists were failing the
politicians. The former highlighted that
demands on Germany’s healthcare system
had in fact been much lower than the virolo-
gists initially predicted.14 The latter criticised
virologist Drosten for his contradictory state-
ments ‘within 24 hours’ about how likely it
was that children could transmit the virus to
adults. (After all, the view that children were
potential Covid-19 prime spreaders had ear-
lier motivated the closing down of the entire
education system.) Lindner now demanded
that the virologists adopt the decision-mak-
ing format of the Catholic Church in select-
ing a Pope, namely internal deliberation
amongst virologists should precede the issu-
ing of policy advice.
Analysing German policy making during
the coronavirus crisis from mid-March to
early May 2020 shows that the core execu-
tives at the national and regional level suc-
ceeded in rapidly concentrating decision-
making power at the top of the pyramid.
What remained in terms of political opposi-
tion during this period was largely limited to
the digital media, which continued question-
ing the government’s expertise and policy
approach in dealing with virus-related issues.
The German core executive’s policies mostly
amounted to the standard response of EU
countries (other than Sweden), namely lock-
down, social distancing, efforts to expand
hospital capacity and, last but not least, eco-
nomic subsidies for those suffering from the
economic results of the closure of the econ-
omy. Such across-the-board application of
lockdown policies underscored the point that
Germany had learned lessons from China as
first responder state. However, this learning
occurred in a fairly indirect manner by way
of policy diffusion: in mid-March 2020 almost
the entire EU rapidly turned to lockdown
policies. Being surrounded by other lock-
down states, the EU’s central country was
bound to follow suit.
Nevertheless, this leaves open the possibil-
ity that the wrong lessons were learned from
China, given the increasing doubt about the
utility of full-scale lockdowns compared with
the experiences of Sweden, South Korea and
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elsewhere. In terms of German learning from
South Korea as second responder state, one
must point out that many Korean policies
overlapped with Chinese ones, namely large-
scale virus testing, quick isolation and treat-
ment of people suffering from severe conse-
quences of a coronavirus infection, and ICT-
based surveillance of citizens via smartphone
apps and other means. What was different
about South Korea was that the country
stopped short of a full-scale lockdown of the
economy. The subsequent fascination of Ger-
man policy makers with Korean smart-
phone-based apps to monitor the spread of
infections, and the wish to copy them as
quickly as possible, only worked to under-
score that the country lacks the precondi-
tions for the quick and successful application
of such technologies.15 After all, Germany
does not enjoy any autonomy in the ICT
field and the population does not consider
the state a credible broker when it comes to
data security. Critics of the suggested app
perceive this technology as an attack on
basic civil liberties. They believe that they
belong to a larger project of universal
surveillance that might also include ‘immu-
nity passports’, global electronic ID manage-
ment and enforced digital payment grids. It
is obvious that new surveillance technologies
raise questions about the protection of civil
liberties that cannot be discussed adequately
under emergency conditions.
Crucially, the overall track record of recent
German emergency policies is open to legiti-
mate questioning. The country was unpre-
pared in terms of the absence of stockpiling
of critical resources such as personal protec-
tive equipment, and many senior citizens
died in care facilities. The crisis also revealed
that around 90 per cent of care workers in
private households in Germany are East
Europeans engaged in a totally unregulated
shadow economy. These informal workers
were forced to leave the country at short
notice owing to the closure of intra-EU
national borders.16 One must suspect that
the unintended consequences of ill-conceived
measures produced many casualties among
senior citizens that were totally unrelated to
the virus.
Perhaps the greatest failure was the gov-
ernment’s decision to limit its utilisation of
expertise to a very small number of hand-
picked experts. This transparent effort to
avoid any emergence of ‘counter-expertise’
produced tunnel vision among decision mak-
ers. It should also be noted that many critical
interventions during Germany’s coronavirus
debate came from external experts acting
independently from and sometimes against
the explicit wishes of the government-
favoured Robert Koch-Institute. For example,
one pathologist’s insistence on conducting
autopsies of people dying with but probably
not from coronavirus established that all
examined cases of people dying with the
virus in the German city state of Hamburg
had suffered from at least one but usually a
number of pre-existing serious health condi-
tions. Moreover, the average age of the
deceased mirrored the average life expec-
tancy.17 Such external interventions made a
major contribution in combatting the feeling
of panic and helplessness in German society.
This example—one of many—clearly demon-
strates that the coronavirus threat cannot
vindicate the government’s closed style of
decision making in recent months.
The public mood finally started to shift in
May when concern over the escalating eco-
nomic costs and ongoing restrictions to con-
stitutional basic rights increasingly entered
the public debate. During this month, the
reopening of the political process changed
the perception of what was going on. In late
May, regional prime ministers from the Left
Party, CDU, and Greens, all announced in
quick succession that they favoured the full
reopening of the economy, combined with
the shifting of anti-virus activities to the local
level for better targeting. At this time, those
warning of a ‘second [coronavirus] wave’
and demanding further lockdown measures
appeared increasingly isolated.
Conclusion
The German core executive began coron-
avirus crisis management in March 2020 by
promising citizens protection from viral risk.
In order to deliver on this promise, the ‘pre-
cautionary principle’ was frequently refer-
enced. However, the practical experience
demonstrated that reducing risk in one area
increased risk in others. Ulrich Beck’s obser-
vation from 2008 deserves to be quoted at
length here:
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Given their task of averting dangers, politi-
cians, in particular, may easily find them-
selves compelled to proclaim that the
observance of security standards is assured
even though such guarantees are impossible.
They do so nonetheless because the political
costs of omission are much higher than those
of an overreaction. It is not going to be easy
in future, therefore, given the state’s promise
of security and a mass media hungry for
catastrophes, to prevent a diabolical power
game with the hysteria of non-knowing.18
During the coronavirus crisis, the core
executive decided what kind of risk was to
be singled out and dealt with. Since there
are always many risks, the act of selecting
which risk to deal with is the moment of rai-
son d’etat.
What follows from this observation is that
it is almost impossible to judge whether Ger-
man politicians were successful or otherwise
in their emergency activities. Any possible
answer to this question depends on what
kind of risk and timeframe is looked at. For
a start, data on the coronavirus crisis is unre-
liable and statistical references have been
used in an arbitrary manner.19 Since every
country had its own way of defining and
counting the victims of coronavirus, subse-
quent cross-country comparison often mea-
sures factors that are not necessarily virus
related. The only conclusion that one can
state with confidence is that pandemics mer-
cilessly expose shortcomings of social inte-
gration. Thus, rather than dwelling on
medical issues, one must instead ask political
questions. Most critical is, of course, who
wins and who loses because of the coron-
avirus crisis and subsequent crisis measures.
The promise to avoid risk for everyone is
something that the political system ulti-
mately cannot deliver on.
One particularly significant follow-up risk
of the initial coronavirus measures concerns
the future relationship between the political
and the legal systems. Since the political sys-
tem applied emergency measures that
harmed certain sectors more than others—
and in totally unforeseeable ways—this
imposition of arbitrary losses inevitably trig-
gers demands for economic bailouts. After
imposing arbitrary losses, the political sys-
tem is now tempted—whether because of
lobbying and/or genuine good intentions—
to deliver ‘help’ that might end up amount-
ing to arbitrary gains for some but not
others. Under these conditions of proliferat-
ing arbitrary acts, the ability of the legal sys-
tem to guarantee predictable and binding
rules for public life is certainly in serious
doubt. Thus, there might be more risk for
everyone and less trust between citizens and
public authorities in the period ahead.
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